Liverpool FC Forum

LIVERPOOLANYTIME wrote:I mean I am really baffled here!!!

Now you know how we feel 

cisses_gona_get_ya wrote:

LIVERPOOLANYTIME wrote:I mean I am really baffled here!!!

Now you know how we feel 

      

Babu , don't worry about it mate , you provided us with hours of fun .

LIVERPOOLANYTIME wrote:I am still a bit lost really baffled here!!!

LIVERPOOLANYTIME wrote:Nowt new in the fact you have very little input apart from banal comments!!

Better Banal than Anal , eh Judge .       

LIVERPOOLANYTIME wrote:Nowt new in the fact you have very little input apart from banal comments!!

For quite a while now psychologists have been interested in the development of the child’s capacity to attribute mental states to others. A first cross-cultural study of this capacity - often referred to as Theory of Mind, or ToM - just came out.
Traditionally, moral psychology has studied the nature of moral judgments, emotions, attitudes, and more generally morally invested psychological states. One question is what aspects of such psychological states should be investigated. Interestingly, philosophers have looked into the functional and representational aspects of moral-psychological states, but have by and large neglected the phenomenological aspects of these states.

To put it simply we have to consider Liveranytimes assement of the Judges contribution in terms of what is phenomenologically manifest in our conscious experience. There are many components/properties to any given conscious experience, but many (most) are not phenomenologically manifest in them. When you perceive a table, you are clearly aware of its visible features (brownness, rectangularity, etc.) in a phenomenologically manifest way. But are you also aware of the table itself, as an object over and above its (visible) properties in a phenomenologically manifest way .Some argue that perceiving a table involves or implies certain expectations as to how the table would appear should one walk around it, away from it, touch it, smell it, etc. Question: are these purely anticipatory components of perception phenomenologically manifest? It is commonly thought that perception has components that are not strictly sensorily given. For instance, when you see your computer, you are at some level aware that it has a backside. Yet the backside is not sensorily given, in that it does not register on your sensorium. So the question arises, Is this awareness of the computer’s backside phenomenologically manifest in your perceptual experience or not? What does all this mean I hear you ask yourself ? Perhaps the level of the Judges banality is dependent on the pespective of the commentator and not necessarily a valid measurement of the Judges creativity.

you may of course disagree with me ?

woof woof ! wrote:

LIVERPOOLANYTIME wrote:Nowt new in the fact you have very little input apart from banal comments!!

For quite a while now psychologists have been interested in the development of the child's capacity to attribute mental states to others. A first cross-cultural study of this capacity - often referred to as Theory of Mind, or ToM - just came out.
Traditionally, moral psychology has studied the nature of moral judgments, emotions, attitudes, and more generally morally invested psychological states. One question is what aspects of such psychological states should be investigated. Interestingly, philosophers have looked into the functional and representational aspects of moral-psychological states, but have by and large neglected the phenomenological aspects of these states.

To put it simply we have to consider Liveranytimes assement of the Judges contribution in terms of what is phenomenologically manifest in our conscious experience. There are many components/properties to any given conscious experience, but many (most) are not phenomenologically manifest in them. When you perceive a table, you are clearly aware of its visible features (brownness, rectangularity, etc.) in a phenomenologically manifest way. But are you also aware of the table itself, as an object over and above its (visible) properties in a phenomenologically manifest way .Some argue that perceiving a table involves or implies certain expectations as to how the table would appear should one walk around it, away from it, touch it, smell it, etc. Question: are these purely anticipatory components of perception phenomenologically manifest? It is commonly thought that perception has components that are not strictly sensorily given. For instance, when you see your computer, you are at some level aware that it has a backside. Yet the backside is not sensorily given, in that it does not register on your sensorium. So the question arises, Is this awareness of the computer's backside phenomenologically manifest in your perceptual experience or not? What does all this mean I hear you ask yourself ? Perhaps the level of the Judges banality is dependent on the pespective of the commentator and not necessarily a valid measurement of the Judges creativity.

you may of course disagree with me ?